

# CV

# DR. KRISTINA ENGELHARD

DFG-Forschergruppe „Causation, Laws of Nature, Dispositions, Explanations“,  
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## POSITION & RESEARCH

**Position** Research Assistant (Wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin) of the DFG-research group „Causation, Laws of Nature, Dispositions, Explanations“ at the Philosophy Department of the University of Cologne (Germany) (<http://www.clde.uni-koeln.de/>)

**AOS** *Historic:*  
Modern philosophy: Classical German Philosophy, esp. Kant and Hegel  
Early Modern: Leibniz and Rationalism  
Contemporary Philosophy: Metaphysics

*Systematic:*  
Metaphysics

**AOC** *Historic:*  
Early Modern: German Scholasticism, philosophy of nature in 17th and 18th century

*Systematic:*  
Philosophy of science, epistemology, logic, aesthetics

## HIGHER EDUCATION

**Doctorate in Philosophy** (Dr. phil.) at the University of Cologne (Germany):

Thesis „The Simple and Matter. Inquiries into Kant’s Antinomy of Division “ („Das Einfache und die Materie. Untersuchungen zu Kants Antinomie der Teilung“) Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Klaus Düsing, second advisor: Prof. Dr. Klaus-Erich Kaehler

Grade: summa cum laude (0,0)

## SCHOLARSHIPS, AWARDS, JOB OFFERS

2006 **Offermann-Hergarten-Prize:** for my Dissertation „Das Einfache und die Materie. Untersuchungen zu Kants Antinomie der Teilung“ (5000 Euro)

1999-2001 PhD-Stipend of the Federal State of North Rhine Westfalia

- 1999 PhD Stipend by DFG (German Research Funding Association) within the Collegium philosophiae transatlanticum: Subject and Person (I did not take this stipend because of a job offer at the University of Cologne; I stayed associate member)
- 2011 Job offer from the Philosophy Department of the University of Sheffield (UK) for a temporary lectureship in „metaphysics and Kant’s theoretical philosophy“ (I did not accept this job offer because of a simultaneous and better job offer from the Philosophy Department of the University of Cologne)

## PUBLICATIONS

**Books:** (1) *Das Einfache und die Materie. Untersuchungen zu Kants Antinomie der Teilung.* Univ.-Diss. Berlin/New York: De Gruyter 2005 (Kantstudien-Ergänzungshefte 146).

### Edited Books

(2) P. Mittelstaedt: *Rational Reconstructions of Modern Physics.* Second enlarged Edition. Dordrecht: Springer 2013.

(3) (with W. Dudley) *Kant. Key Concepts.* Durham: Acumen: 2011 (articles by: E. Carson, K. Flikschuh, P. Frierson, M. Grier, P. Guyer, D. Heidemann, S. Houlgate, G. Mohr/U. Rühl, K. Pillow, K. R. Westphal, J. Zammito, G. Zöllner).

(4) (with M. Quante) *E. Rózsa: Hegels Konzeption der praktischen Individualität. Von der "Phänomenologie des Geistes" zum enzyklopädischen System.* Paderborn: Mentis 2007.

(5) (with D. H. Heidemann) *Ethikbegründungen zwischen Universalismus und Relativismus.* Berlin / New York: De Gruyter 2005 (articles by: J. A. Aertsen, M. Baum, D. O. Dahlstrom, K. Engelhard, J. Halfwassen, D. H. Heidemann, H. Kimmerle, A. Neschke-Henschke, A. Peperzak, M. Quante, K. Westphal, T. Rockmore, T. Schlicht, L. Siep, B. Tuschling, G. Zöllner,).

(6) (with D. H. Heidemann) *Warum Kant heute? Systematische Bedeutung und Rezeption seiner Philosophie in der Gegenwart.* Berlin/New York: De Gruyter (Studienbuch) 2004 (Mit Beiträgen von E. Angehrn, K. Ameriks, D. O. Dahlstrom, K. Düsing, K. Engelhard, B. Falkenburg, I. Fetscher, T. Grundmann, P. Guyer, D. H. Heidemann, W. Lütterfelds, P. Mittelstaedt, H.-G. Schmitz, D. Sturma, G. Schönrich).

(7) (with the president of the University of Cologne, Tassilo Küpper): *Immanuel Kant. Leben – Werk – Wirkung. Gedächtnisschrift zum 200. Todestag*. Köln: Kirsch-Verlag 2004 (179 S.) (darin Artikel zu Kant (Leben und Werk), zur Naturphilosophie (u.a. Galilei, Newton, Euler, Lambert, Laplace, Blumenbach, Bonnet, Buffon), Metaphysik, Ästhetik und Ethik der Neuzeit).

(8) *Aufklärungen*. Festschrift für Klaus Düsing zum 60. Geburtstag. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot 2002 (Philosophische Schriften 47) (articles by: K. Engelhard, D. Fonfara, Morteza Ghasempour, D. H. Heidemann, Chr. Hanewald, Rainer Schäfer, Tobias Schlicht, Anja Solbach).

**In Production:**

(9) (with M. Quante) *Handbook of Potentiality*. Published with Springer 2015. (articles by: K. Engelhard, F. de Haas, R. Hendry/P. Needham, F. Hofmann, A. Hüttemann/M. Kaiser, M. Kistler, T. Kukkonen, M.-Th. Liske, S. Makin, A. Marmodoro, J. McKittrick, S. Mumford/R.L. Anjum, K. Saporiti, S. Schmid, O. Scholz, M. Stier, B. Vetter).

**Articles**

(1) *Können Dispositionen das Realismus-Problem des transzendentalen Idealismus lösen?* In: M. Egger (Ed.): *Philosophie nach Kant. Neue Wege zum Verständnis von Kants Transzendental- und Moralphilosophie*. Berlin, New York: De Gruyter 2014, pp. 15-36.

(2) *Kant's Theory of Causality: Categories, Laws and Powers*. Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses. Berlin / New York: De Gruyter 2013, pp. 557-567.

(4b) *Das Problem des Widerspruchs in Hegels System*. In: Chr. Jamme/Y. Kubo (Eds.): *Logik und Realität. Wie systematisch ist Hegels System?* Paderborn: Fink 2012, pp. 207-233.

(3) *Empirische Naturgesetze bei Kant*. In: T. Schlicht (Ed): *Zweck und Natur*. Paderborn: Fink 2011, S. 55-89.

(4) *Reflexion und Widerspruch bei Hegel*. In: *Studien zu Hegels Philosophie* 16 (2010), pp. 35-47 (Japanese).

(5) El destino de la experiencia de la consciencia en la Fenomenología del espíritu: El saber absoluto (*The Destination of the Experience of Consciousness in Hegel's "Phenomenology of Spirit": Absolute Knowing*). In: V. Lemm/J. O. Karzulovic (Eds.): Hegel, pensador de la actualidad. Santiago de Chile: Editiones Universidad Diego Portales: 2010, pp. 75-100 (Spanish)

(6) *Categories and the ontology of powers. A semi-dualist account of pandispositionalism*. In: Anna Marmodoro (Ed.): *The Metaphysics of Powers. Their Grounding and their Manifestations*. New York: Routledge 2010, pp. 41-57.

(7) *Kants physische Monadologie und dynamische Materietheorie. Die vorkritische Theorie und ihre Kritik*. In: *Der Monadenbegriff zwischen Spätrenaissance und Aufklärung*. Hanns-Peter Neumann (Ed.). Berlin, New York: De Gruyter 2009, pp. 301-338.

(8) (with Peter Mittelstaedt) *Kant's Theory of Arithmetic – A Constructive Approach?* In: *Journal for General Philosophy of Science* 39 (2008), pp. 245-271.

(9) *Hegels Kritik an Kants Theorie des individuellen Subjekts* (Hungarian: *Az egyedi szubjektum kanti elméletének kritikája Hegel gyakorlati filozófiájában*). In: *Hegel. Individualitás-elmélete*. Hrsg. v. M. Quante / E. Rózsa. Kellék 33-34 (2007), pp. 145-163.

(10) *Hegel über Kant. Vier Argumente gegen den transzendentalen Idealismus*. In: Heidemann, D. H. / Krijnen, Chr. (Ed.): *Hegel und die Geschichte der Philosophie*. Darmstadt: WBG 2007, pp. 191-216.

(11) *Grundprobleme der Ethikbegründung*. Einleitung in: (Ed. with D.H. Heidemann) *Ethikbegründungen zwischen Universalismus und Relativismus*. Berlin / New York: De Gruyter 2005, pp. 1-10.

(12) *Leibniz' rationalistische Ethikbegründung*. In: (Ed. with D.H. Heidemann) *Ethikbegründungen zwischen Universalismus und Relativismus*. Berlin / New York: De Gruyter 2005, pp. 121-152.

(13) *Immanuel Kant. Leben – Werk – Wirkung. Finissage der Ausstellung in der Universitäts- und Stadtbibliothek Köln*. In: *Kölner Universitäts-Journal* 34 (2004), pp. 25-26.

(14) *Der Begriff der Erscheinung bei Leibniz und Kant*. In: *Aufklärung und Kritik*. Festschrift für Manfred Baum zum 65. Geburtstag. D. Hüning, K. Michel and A. Thomas (Eds.). Berlin: Duncker & Humblot 2004 (Philosophische Schriften 57), pp. 157-188.

(15) *Zur Rolle metaphysischer Annahmen für die Erkenntnis*. In: K. Gloy (Hrsg.): *Unser Zeitalter – ein postmetaphysisches?* München: Königshausen und Neumann 2004 (Studien zum System der Philosophie), pp. 261-276.

(16) *Kant und die Gegenwartsphilosophie* (gemeinsam mit D. H. Heidemann). Einleitung in: Dietmar H. Heidemann und Kristina Engelhard (Ed.): *Warum Kant heute? Systematische Bedeutung und Rezeption seiner Philosophie in der Gegenwart*. Berlin/New York 2004 (Studienbuch), pp. 1-13.

(17) *Kant in der Gegenwertsästhetik*. In: Dietmar H. Heidemann und Kristina Engelhard (Ed.): *Warum Kant heute? Systematische Bedeutung und Rezeption seiner Philosophie in der Gegenwart*. Berlin/New York 2004 (Studienbuch), pp. 352-382.

(18) *Rationalistischer Monismus und Leibniz' Theorie der Materie*. In: Kristina Engelhard (Ed.): *Aufklärungen*. Festschrift für Klaus Düsing zum 60. Geburtstag. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot 2002 (Philosophische Schriften 47), pp. 39-62.

(19) *Zeitmodi und Naturzeit in Kants „Kritik der reinen Vernunft“*. In: V. Gerhardt / R.-P. Horstmann / R. Schumacher (Eds.): *Kant und die Berliner Aufklärung*. Akten des IX. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses. Berlin / New York 2001. Bd. 2, pp. 146-157.

**Work in Progress:**

(20) *Freiheit in möglichen Welten. Wird das Problem der Freiheit bei Leibniz durch mögliche Welten gelöst?* (in manuscript).

(21) *Dispositions and Potentials*. In: K. Engelhard / M. Quante (Eds.): *Handbook of Potentiality*. Published with Springer 2015.

## Encyclopedia Articles:

(22) ‚Kausalität‘, ‚Ursache‘, ‚Wirkung‘, ‚Wirkung und Gegenwirkung‘, ‚Durck und Stoß‘, ‚actio / passio‘ u.a. In: Kant-Lexikon. G. Mohr / J. Stolzenberg / M. Willaschek (Eds.). Berlin / New York: De Gruyter. (forthcoming)

(23) David Armstrong: A World of States of Affairs. In: Kleines Werklexikon der Philosophie. M. Quante (Ed.). Stuttgart: Kröner. (forthcoming)

## Reviews:

(24) Otfried Höffe: Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Die Grundlegung der modernen Philosophie, München: C. H. Beck 2003. In : Philosophisches Jahrbuch (2005), pp. 195-198.

(25) (a) M. Kistler/B. Gnessounou (Eds.): Dispositions and Causal Powers. London: Ashgate 2007; (b) T. Handfield (Ed.): Dispositions and Causes. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2009. In: Philosophiegeschichte und logische Analyse 13 (2010), pp. 155-165.

## CONFERENCE PAPERS & INVITED TALKS

- (1) *Dispositionen und Realismus bei Kant*. Vortrag auf dem Symposium „Die Tradition des Idealismus. Symposium zum 75. Geburtstag von Klaus Düsing“ Universität zu Köln (6.11.2015).
- (2) *Dispositions manifest themselves*. Vortrag auf der Konferenz „Dispositions & Manifestations“ an der Universität zu Köln (21./22.8.2015).
- (3) *Die Macht der Eigenschaften. Eine aristotelische Dispositionentheorie*. Bewerbungsvortrag für die W2-Professur für „Theoretische Philosophie“ an der Johann Wolfgang Goethe Universität Frankfurt am Main (20.7.2015).
- (4) (mit Dietmar Heidemann) *Kant's Legacy*. Vortrag auf der Konferenz „A Dialog between Kant and the Sciences“ Exploring new perspectives in the history and philosophy of science. an der Universität Dortmund (9.-11.7.2015).
- (5) *Kants Konzeption empirischer Naturgesetze*. Vortrag an der Universität Bochum (2.7.2015).

- (6) (mit Florian Fischer): *Commentary to Thomas Müller: „Toward a formal model for dispositions and persistence conditions“*. WWW/CLDE Workshop, Universität Konstanz (1./2.5.2015).
- (7) *Immanenz und Transparenz der Vernunft*. Bewerbungsvortrag für die W2-Professur für „Klassische Deutsche Philosophie“ an der Rheinischen Friedrich Wilhelms Universität Bonn (20.4.2015).
- (8) *Inkonsistente Gesetze?* Conference paper on the workshop „Kant on Laws/Kant über Naturgesetze“ (Universität zu Köln 3.11.2014)
- (9) *Constructing the Objects of Arithmetic*. Paper for the conference „Kant's Philosophy of Mind and Knowledge“. (Luxemburg 28. und 29.10.2013).
- (10) *Dispositions: Latency and Manifestation as states?* Workshop-paper for a workshop with Jennifer McKittrick (Cologne, 23. Juli 2012).
- (11) *Erkenntnisvermögen und Realismus bei Kant*. Invited talk, University of Leipzig (23.5.2012).
- (12) *Comment on the paper „Powers take their Field“ by Richard Corry*. Conference paper on the workshop: „Dispositions and Modality“ at the University of Cologne (7.-9.3.2012).
- (13) *Was sind und wozu brauchen wir fundamentale Eigenschaften? Kritik an einem Standardmodell von Dispositionen*. Conference paper at the workshop: Fundamental Properties. Université de Luxembourg (1.10.2011).
- (14) *Kant's antinomies – A lesson on the possibility of metaphysics?* Job talk at the Philosophy Department of the University of Sheffield, UK (29.7.2011).
- (15) *Dispositionen*. Invited talk, University of Dortmund (25.5.2011).
- (16) *Empirische Naturgesetze bei Kant*. Conference paper at the Philosophisches Kolloquium, Philosophisches Seminar, Universität Göttingen (2.12.2010).
- (17) *Causation and Laws of Nature in Kant*. Conference paper at the XIth International Kant-Congress in Pisa, Italy (23. 5.2010).

- (18) *Kant's theory of causation. A solution for today's philosophical problems?* Conference paper at the conference „Between Physics and Philosophy“. Institute of Physics, Universität zu Köln (4-5.12.2009).
- (19) *Categories and the ontology of powers. A semi-dualist account of pandispositionalism.* Conference paper at the conference „Gesellschaft für analytische Philosophie“ GAP 7 (17.9.2009).
- (20) *Kant's Theory of Causation: Categories, Laws, and Dispositions.* Invited talk at the „Metaphysics of Science Project“ groupe at the University of Nottingham (13.5.2009).
- (21) *Categories and an Identity Theory of Powers.* Invited talk at the University of Nottingham (12.5.2009).
- (22) *Reflexion und Widerspruch bei Hegel.* Conference paper at the conference „Wie systematisch ist Hegels System?“ in Tokyo (3.3 - 6.3.2009) and in Niigate (7.3.2009).
- (23) *Was ist Materie? Kant und das Problem der zweiten Antinomie.* Invited talk at the Philosophisches Seminar of the Universität Mannheim (2.12.2008).
- (24) *Kant on Causation. Still a Theory worth noticing?* Invited talk at Williams College, Williamstown, USA (September 2008).
- (25) *Hegel on/in Contradiction.* Invited talk at the New School, New York (August 2008).
- (26) *The Reality of Powers* (invited speaker to the international conference “Powers: Their Grounding and Their Realization”. Oxford University, 7th -9th July 2008). (Programm: [http://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/events/powers\\_conference](http://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/events/powers_conference)).
- (27) *Reality Claims of dispositional Realism.* Invited talk at Hofstra University, New York (5.3. 2008).
- (28) *What Reality for Dispositions? The hidden Structure of a multi-layered Debate.* Conference paper at the international workshop “Dispositions and Causation” in Münster (27.11.2007).
- (29) *The Destination of the Experience of Consciousness in Hegel's "Phenomenology of Spirit": Absolute Knowing.* Conference paper at the conference “Hegel – Pensador de la Actualidad“ in Santiago de Chile (5.9.2007).
- (30) *Hegel on Contradiction in a contemporary perspective.* Conference paper at the 2nd International Hegel Workshop. London, University College (7.7.2007).



- (31) *Apriorische oder empirische Kausalität bei Kant*. Jobtalk for a position as Juniorprofessor (W 1) for History of Philosophy and/or Ethics at the Universität Bielefeld (3.7.2007).
- (32) *Hegels Kritik an Kants Theorie des individuellen Subjekts*. Conference paper at the conference „Hegels Konzeption der modernen Individualität“ in Debrecen, Hungary (29.9.2006).
- (33) *Hegel on/in Contradiction*. Invited talk at the University of Copenhagen, Denmark (22.3.2006).
- (34) *Freiheit in möglichen Welten*. Invited talk at the Universität Flensburg (5.7. 2006).
- (35) *Seele – Geist – Gehirn. Der Physikalismus und ein Strukturproblem*. Conference paper at the conference „Seele – Geist – Gehirn“ at the Philosophisches Seminar der Universität zu Köln (25.10.2005).
- (36) *Kant über das Teilungsproblem der Materie*. Philosophisches Kolloquium Universität zu Köln (27.11.2003).
- (37) *Zuviel Zärtlichkeit für die Dinge. Hegels Kritik an Kants Antinomienlehre*. Conference paper at the conference „Hegel und die Geschichte der Philosophie“, Universität zu Köln (22.10.2003).
- (38) *Substanzontologie und Phänomenalismus. Leibniz und Kant über das Teilungsproblem der Materie*. Invited talk at the Technische Universität Berlin (26.6.2003).
- (39) *Zur Rolle metaphysischer Annahmen für die Erkenntnis*. Conference paper at the conference of the International Society „System der Philosophie“ „Unser Zeitalter – ein postmetaphysisches?“ Luzern, Switzerland (8.6.2003).
- (40) *Idealismus oder Realismus der Körperwelt: eine prästabilisierte Disharmonie in Leibniz' Universum?* Invited talk at the Philosophischer Zirkel, Universität Münster (20.1.2003).
- (41) *Zeitmodi und Naturzeit in Kants „Kritik der reinen Vernunft“*, Conference paper at the conference „IXth International Kant-Congress“, Berlin 2000.

## REFEREE WORK

- Referee for the Research Foundation of Flanders, Belgium
- „International Journal for Philosophy of Science“ (Taylor & Francis) (Editor in Chief: James W. McAllister)
- „Dialectica“ (Blackwell) (Editors in Chief: P. Engel / P. Keller)
- „Kant-Yearbook“ (De Gruyter) (Editor-in-Chief: D.H. Heidemann )

- „Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. An International Forum” (Springer), (Editor-in-Chief: F. R. Heeger, main editor: A.W. Musschenga)
- “Medicine, Healthcare and Philosophy. A European Journal” (Springer) (Editor-in-Chief: F. Schmuhl)
- Oxford University Press

## TEACHING

- SS 2001 - Undergraduate course: Kants Theorie von Raum und Zeit in der *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*  
 - Undergraduate course: Introduction to Philosophy
- WS 2001/2002 - Undergraduate course: Leibniz' *Metaphysische Abhandlung*  
 - Undergraduate course: Introduction to Philosophy  
 - Philosophical Colloquium
- SS 2002 - Undergraduate course: Der Anfang in der Philosophie des Rationalismus (Descartes: *Meditationen*)  
 - Undergraduate course: Introduction to Philosophy  
 - Philosophical Colloquium
- WS 2002/2003 - Undergraduate course: Kants Ästhetik (*Kritik der ästhetischen Urteilskraft*)  
 - Undergraduate course: Introduction to Philosophy  
 - Philosophical Colloquium
- SS 2003 - Undergraduate course: Das sinnliche Scheinen der Idee (Hegels *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik*)  
 - Undergraduate course: Introduction to Philosophy  
 - Philosophical Colloquium
- WS 2003/2004 - Undergraduate course: Einführung in die sprachanalytische Philosophie (Ernst Tugendhat: *Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die sprachanalytische Philosophie*)  
 - Undergraduate course: Introduction to Philosophy  
 - Philosophical Colloquium

- SS 2004 - Undergraduate course: Philosophische Probleme der Logik (logic course)  
 - Undergraduate course: Introduction to Philosophy  
 - Philosophical Colloquium
- WS 2004/2005 - Undergraduate course: Philosophische Probleme der Logik (logic course)  
 - Undergraduate course: Introduction to Philosophy  
 - Philosophical Colloquium
- SS 2005 - Undergraduate course: Einführung in die Philosophie Johann Gottlieb Fichtes (*Erste Einleitung*)  
 - Undergraduate course: Introduction to Philosophy  
 - Philosophical Colloquium
- WS 2005/2006 - Undergraduate course: Immanuel Kant: *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*  
 - Undergraduate course: Introduction to Philosophy  
 - Philosophical Colloquium
- SS 2006 - Undergraduate course: Das philosophische Problem des Raumes (Der Leibniz-Clarke-Briefwechsel)  
 - Undergraduate course: Introduction to Philosophy  
 - Philosophical Colloquium
- WS 2006/2007 - Graduate course (with Prof. Peter Mittelstaedt): Space, time, and matter. Kant and contemporary physics  
 - Undergraduate course: Introduction to Philosophy  
 - Philosophical Colloquium
- SS 2007 - Graduate course (with Prof. Klaus Düsing): Identität und Widerspruch in Hegels *Wissenschaft der Logik*  
 - Graduate course (with D. Schweikard): Musikästhetik der Gegenwart  
 - Philosophical Colloquium
- WS 2007/2008 - Graduate course: Kausalität  
 - Undergraduate course: Introduction to Philosophy  
 - Philosophical Colloquium

- SS 2008 - Graduate course: Eigenschaften  
 - Undergraduate course: Philosophical Reasoning  
 - Philosophical Colloquium
- WS 2008/2009 - Graduate course: Conditionals  
 - Undergraduate course: Philosophical Reasoning  
 - Philosophical Colloquium
- SS 2009 - Graduate course: David Armstrong: A World of States of Affairs  
 - Undergraduate course: Philosophical Reasoning  
 - Philosophical Colloquium
- WS 2009/2010 - Lecture: History of Philosophy  
 - Tutorial accompanying the lecture  
 - Research Colloquium
- SS 2010 - Graduate course: Laws of Nature (with Prof. Peter Mittelstaedt)  
 - Philosophical Colloquium
- WS 2010/2011 - Graduate course: Willard Van Orman Quine  
 - Philosophical Colloquium
- SS 2011 - Graduate course: The Metaphysics of Modality  
 - Undergraduate course: Kant's Theory of Space and Time in the  
 „Transcendental Aesthetics“ of the *Critique of Pure Reason*  
 - Philosophical Colloquium
- WS 2011/2012 - Graduate course: Kant's *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural  
 Science* (with A. Hüttemann)  
 - Philosophical Colloquium
- SS 2012 - Undergraduate course: Plato's *Theaitetus*

## SUPERVISOR OF DISSERTATIONS

2010-2011: Supervisor of a dissertation of a DAAD-scholar from Argentina (DAAD-Snadwich-stipend) Natalia Andrea Lerussi

2015: Supervisor of a dissertation of a DAAD-scholar from Argentina (DAAD-Snadwich-stipend) Miguel Herszenbaun

## UNIVERSITY SERVICE

2003, 2008, 2011-2012	Assistant to the Head of Department
2004, 2007/2008	Member of Search Committees
2003	Program Committee
Since 2001	Study advisor and supervisor, freshman advising

## COMPLETE EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

Since 2013	Research Assistant (Wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin) of the DFG-research group „Causation, Laws of Nature, Dispositions, Explanations“ at the Philosophy Department of the University of Cologne (Germany) ( <a href="http://www.clde.uni-koeln.de/">http://www.clde.uni-koeln.de/</a> )
2010-2013	Research and Teaching Assistant (Wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin) at the Philosophy Department of the University of Cologne (since 12/2012 to Andreas Hüttemann) (2012-2013 parental leave)
2009-2010	Visiting Professor at the Department of Philosophy at the Goethe Universität Frankfurt am Main (replacement of the chair of modern philosophy: Prof. Dr. Marcus Willaschek)
2001-2009	Research and Teaching Assistant (Wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin) to Klaus Düsing, then with Michael Quante at the University of Cologne

## COMPLETE HIGHER EDUCATION

1998-2003	<b>Doctorate in Philosophy</b> at the University of Cologne (Germany): Thesis „The Simple and Matter. Inquiries into Kant’s Antinomy of Division“ („Das Einfache und die Materie. Untersuchungen zu Kants Antinomie der Teilung“) Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Klaus Düsing, Second advisor: Prof. Dr. Klaus-Erich Kaehler
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*Können Dispositionen das Realismus-Problem  
des transzendentalen Idealismus lösen?*

In: M. Egger (Ed.): Philosophie nach Kant. Neue Wege zum Verständnis von Kants Transzendental- und Moralphilosophie. Berlin, New York: De Gruyter 2014, pp. 15-36.

The paper explores several objectivist attempts to solve the realism-problem of Kant's transcendental idealism and suggests a new dispositionalist approach. Kant's transcendental idealism has faced the objection that it amounts to a complete idealism that is contrary to a reasonable form of realism concerning the existence of outer, mind-independent objects. In the recent literature there have been several attempts to find interpretations of central doctrines in Kant's *Critique of pure Reason* that don't give rise to those accusations and try to show that transcendental idealism is compatible with a brand of reasonable realism. Starting with the aim to go in the same direction, the paper then analyses the shortcomings of those interpretations (Allais, Langton, Rosefeldt). In the paper I defend the following claims: The claim that transcendental idealism is no genuine realism and not compatible with any form of reasonable realism may be justified by text-evidences, it is however myopic. An adequate understanding of the concept of appearance on the one hand and the capacity of knowledge on the other hand enables a reading of Kant's transcendental idealism that is compatible with an acceptable form of realism. To make this possible I give a reading of the objects in space and time and the capacity of knowledge that takes them both to be entities with dispositional properties. Thus, the reference of the capacities of knowledge to the objects in space and time is understood as mutual manifestation of dispositions. This reading takes up scattered interpretations of Kant in terms of dispositions (Watkins, Rosefeldt), but develops them relevantly further. The idea is that a dispositional account can make sense of Kant's claim that reason prescribes the laws to nature without taking it to mean that nature is mind-dependent. On the contrary, the determinate properties of objects in space and time are products of mutual manifestations of dispositions, the objects dispositions on the one hand and the capacities of knowledge's dispositions on the other. In the last section of the paper this account is defended against objections.

*Empirische Naturgesetze bei Kant.*

In: Zweck und Natur. Ed. by T. Schlicht. Paderborn: Fink 2011, pp. 55-89.

In this paper I investigate the concept of empirical laws of nature in Kant. On the basis of Kant's fundamental claim that the concept of law presupposes strict universality and

necessity and his claim that we can only achieve knowledge of necessary truths a priori the concept of empirical laws of nature seem to be a *contradictio in adiecto*. Nevertheless Kant uses it. Kant's *dictum* that the laws of nature have to be a priori has struck most philosophers of science of today as absurd since we think of scientific knowledge today as being at least strongly supported by the practice of experimentation. My aim is first to give an analysis of Kant's use of this concept, then I claim that Kant introduces it despite its dubious status in his philosophy because it fulfils a necessary role in an overall account of laws of nature; I show that he had to introduce the concept of empirical laws because the a priori laws are incomplete concerning their explanatory function. Then I claim that Kant's main concern with empirical laws of nature is to secure their law-status despite their origin in experience. To meet this challenge empirical laws have to make up a system of laws. I show that Kant maintains two conceptions of such a system, in one of them empirical laws are laws because they are deductively connected with a priori laws and are hence part of a complete system of the laws of nature. The lawhood of empirical laws is guaranteed by being backed by a priori laws. According to the second conception empirical laws are laws if they are part of a complete and comprehensive system of only empirical laws; according to this conception empirical laws are laws because they are part of a complete system of the empirical laws that fulfils further conditions of systematicity, one of them being simplicity. In a last paragraph I compare Kant's views on empirical laws with the Ramsey-Lewis best system account with the laws supervening on loose facts. One problem of such accounts is to give an explanation why our believe that the laws of the best system are the genuine laws of nature is rational. I show that Kant's conception of the simplest system of empirical laws differs from the Lewis Ramsey-view in that Kant gives an a priori justification for the systematicity conditions, and hence an explanation for the rationality of our believe in the best system, whereas Lewis must concede that it depends on contingent fact whether we have epistemic access to the best system of laws or not, hence he can only appeal to the reliability of our scientific knowledge to explain the rationality of our believe.

*Das Problem des Widerspruchs in Hegels System.*

In: Logik und Realität. Wie systematisch ist Hegels System? Chr. Jamme/Y.

Kubo (Eds.). Paderborn: Fink 2012 (forthcoming).

In this paper I analyse Hegel's concept of contradiction that is deeply rooted in his philosophy of dialectic. Traditional Hegel interpretation took it that Hegel held the provocative claim that there are true contradictions and even that the world is fundamentally constituted by contradictory facts. This interpretation led to the dismissal of Hegel's philosophy by most philosophers on the basis of the allegation that Hegelian thought contravenes the most fundamental principle of logic and that it is hence irrational. Hegel scholars of the last decades fought for their contrary claim that Hegel did not assume the contradictory nature of the world but that he obeyed classical logic and held that there are no true contradictions, in order to rehabilitate Hegel's



philosophy. My aim is to show on the one hand that this new Hegel-interpretation is wrong, but that Hegel actually held the claim that there are true contradictions. On the other hand I also show that the motivation to reject this reading, the worry of irrationality, is maybe ill founded because the developments of non-classical logics during the last decades have also shown that paraconsistent logical calculi are possible. There are even philosophers who think that this has ontological impact and that the world is at its outer limits contradictory (G. Priest). In the light of these recent developments I analyse Hegel's claim of the contradictory nature of the ontological fundament of the universe in his concept of concept.

*Categories and the ontology of powers. A semi-dualist account of pandispositionalism.*

In: *The Metaphysics of Powers. Their Grounding and their Manifestations.*  
Anna Marmodoro (Ed.). New York: Routledge 2010, pp. 41-57.

In this paper I critically examine several forms of dispositionalism, the claim that properties have a dispositional nature. My main target is pandispositionalism, the view that all properties are dispositional and that they are exhausted by their dispositional nature. Pandispositionalism is an attractive view with respect to simplicity because it assumes only one kind of property and it promises to give new and better accounts of laws of nature, causation and presumably also modality. Nevertheless, my paper is motivated by a concern that pandispositionalism cannot accommodate what I call the dualist intuition. The dualist intuition is, as I claim, an intuition that motivates a number of arguments against pandispositionalism. I discuss those arguments and evaluate the pandispositionalist responses. It turns out that pandispositionalism is able to give persuasive replies to these objections, but it is not able to put the dualist intuition at rest. The reason, in my eyes, is that it cannot give a persuasive model of the unique structure of dispositional properties. Pandispositionalism claims that dispositional properties are powers, they enforce their bearers. The identity of those powers is fixed by the manifestation of the powers. The manifestation of a power is numerically different power, the identity of power F is fixed by power G. Pandispositionalism also claims that at the same time F is a cause of G. There is a number of objections that try to tackle pandispositionalism by showing that it involves vicious regresses. One of them says that if F's identity is fixed by G and G's identity has to be fixed by some H, and so an *ad infinitum* then the identity-fixation cannot succeed. Pandispositionalist tend to give a structuralist response to these objections saying that identity fixation can be achieved by structures alone without there having to be fixed elements. I then try to motivate a view according to which properties have dispositional natures but at the same time they also have a qualitative nature. Both features of properties are necessarily linked. This so-called identity theory of properties does not fall short of the regress arguments because the identity of a property is fixed by itself. But there are severe problems to this view, one of them is the worry how to hold those two features apart on metaphysical grounds without splitting up the property in two. Finally I examine briefly whether a

category ontology is able to introduce an ontological difference within one and the same property.

## ABSTRACT OF FIRST BOOK (DISSERTATION)

*Das Einfache und die Materie. Untersuchungen zu Kants Antinomie der Teilung.* Univ.-Diss. Berlin/New York: De Gruyter 2005 (Kantstudien-Ergänzungshefte 146).

My dissertation is about the complex of philosophical problems connected with the second antinomy in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. The second of the four antinomies of pure reason consists of the two mutually exclusive claims that any composite substance in the world consists of simple parts and that no composite thing is composed of simples. According to Kant this antinomy arises out of reason's aim to achieve the unconditioned. They are metaphysical claims, each equally well justifiable. Nevertheless Kant wants to show that both claims together presuppose a metaphysical thesis and that it is not without alternative. It is the thesis of empirical realism, saying that appearances are things in themselves. Kant thinks that empirical realism implies the principle of complete metaphysical determination which in turn goes along with the principle of bivalence. Hence only if appearances are things in themselves one is justified to believe that the objects of outer reality completely determinate in all their properties independent of them being determined epistemically. Hence, of any predicate either it or its negation applies to the object in question. Concerning the composition of matter this means, according to empirical realism matter either consists of simples or it doesn't, independent of matter being epistemically determined. Now Kant shows that if the thesis of empirical realism is given up and hence also the principles of complete determination and bivalence, which is equivalent with taking the thesis of transcendental idealism, we are able to conceive of the composition of matter as depending on our systematizing of the involved data. I show that in his writings about the metaphysics of nature, the "Metaphysical Foundations of natural Science", the "Critique of Judgment" and also in the "Opus postumum" Kant is best understood if one takes him to deal with the question of the composition of matter as relative to the a priori available models of composition, chosen on the basis of explanatory power. Therefore my thesis interprets Kant's theory of matter as a theory of model relativity. So, as I take Kant, his account amounts to the following: We think of matter as being composed of simples if we want to give an explanation of certain properties, if this meets best the relevant data. But we can also think of matter as not being composed of simples but as being some kind of continuous substance if we want to explain certain other properties, if this meets best the relevant data. So the question whether matter is composed of simples is relevant to us only if we take it as a question that can be empirically settled with devices that are given to us partly a priori. If we take it as a

metaphysical question alone we are left with the danger of getting into the antinomy and hence not being able to find an ultimately persuasive answer.

The book comprises three aspects of the topic. It gives an argumentative analysis of Kant's account of the problem of the divisibility of matter in the different stages of his philosophical development with a historical study in early modern thought, specifically the discussion about the composition of matter and monadology in the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> century and with an interpretation of Kant's own account of matter on the background of the contemporary debate about the role of models in science.

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## PROFILE – SHORT OVERVIEW

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- Numerous **edited books**
- **Awards** (Offermann Hergarten Preis for my dissertation, dissertation stipend of the state of North Rhine Westfalia)
- Organisation of many international **conferences**
- **Reviewer** of international journals and research organisations
- **Member of the editorial board** of the *Kant Yearbook* (De Gruyter)
- Experiences on all levels of **academic self-organisation**