skip to content

Curriculum vitae

Thomas Grundmann

Department of Philosophy
Albertus Magnus Platz
University of Cologne
D-50923 Köln
Tel.: +49 (0)221 470-4477 (Office)
Tel.: +49 (0)221 470-2451 (Phil. Dep.)
Email: thomas.grundmann(at)uni-koeln.de


CV as PDF
 

Education

2001                    Habilitation in Philosophy, University of Tübingen, Germany

1992                    Doctor of Philosophy (summa cum laude), University of Tübingen, Germany

1988-1992           PhD Student, University of Tübingen, Germany

1988                    First State Examination in Philosophy, German Literature, Tübingen, Germany

1984-1988           Graduate Student of Philosophy, German Literature and Classics, University of Tübingen, Germany

1981-1984           Undergraduate Student of Philosophy, German Literature, Classics and History, Ludwig-Albrecht University Freiburg/Breisgau

 

Employment

Since 2010          Full Professor (W3) of Philosophy, University of Cologne, Germany

2004-2010           Associate Professor (C3) of Epistemology, Logic and Philosophy of Science, University of Cologne, Germany

2003-2004           Fixed-Term Associate Professor (C2) of Philosophy, University of Saarbrücken, Germany

2002-2003           Interim-Professorships at the Universities of Essen, University of Tübingen, HU Berlin

1997-2001           Assistant Professor (without tenuer), Department of Philosophy, University of Tübingen, Germany

1996-1997           Postdoctoral Researcher, Department of Philosophy, UC Berkeley, USA

1992-1996           Assistant Professor (without tenure), Department of Philosophy, University of Tübingen

 

Extended Scholarly Visits

UC Irvine, USA (April 2014)

Northwestern University, Evanston, USA (February - March 2013)

UC Berkeley, Berkeley, USA (1996-1997)

 

Areas of Specialization and Competence

AOS:   Epistemology, Metaphilosophy, Philosophy of Mind, History of Philosophy,

            Analytic Existentialism

AOC: Philosophy of Language, Logic

 

Major Administrative Service

Since 2019          Head of the Department of Philosophy, University of Cologne

Since 2019          Vice-President of the German Society for Analytic Philosophy

Since 2017          Vice-Director of the Center for Language, Information and Philosophy (CLIP), University of Cologne

2016-2018           President of the German Society for Analytic Philosophy (GAP)

2013-2015           Vice-President of the German Society for Analytic Philosophy

2012-2013           Head of the Department of Philosophy, University of Cologne

2006-2007           Head of the Department of Philosophy, University of Cologne

2005-2013           Member of the “Strukturkommission”, School of Humanities, University of Cologne

2013-2015           Member of the “Engere Fakultät”, School of Humanities, University of Cologne

 

  • Reviewer for funding bodies: DAAD, DFG, Humboldt Foundation, Studienstiftung des deutschen Volkes, Volkswagen Stiftung
  • Reviewer for journals: Analysis, Dialectica, Erkenntnis, Episteme, Ethical Theory and Moral Practise, Grazer Philosophische Studien, Kant Yearbook, Mind, Philosophiegeschichte und logische Analyse, Philosophia, Philosophical Psychology, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Synthese, Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung
  • Board member (journals, etc.): Episteme, Kant Yearbook, Social Epistemology Network, Fachinformationsdienst Philosophy, Graduiertenkolleg “Situated Cognition” (Bochum. Osnabrück).
  • Membership (academic societies): German Society for Analytic Philosophy (GAP), DGPhil

 

Grants

Since 2015          DFG Research-Grant (GR 1884/8-1) “Disagreement in Philosophy. Semantic and epistemological Foundations” (2015-2019), University of Cologne

2009-2011           DFG Research-Grant (GR 1884/4-1) “Conceptual Analysis and Metaphysics”, University of Cologne

2007-2010           DFG Research-Grant (GR 1884/3-1) “Conceptual Analysis and the Naturalist Challenges”, University of Cologne

1996-1997           Feodor-Lynen Postdoctoral Grant (Humboldt Foundation), UC Berkeley, USA

1989-1991           PhD Fellowship, Baden-Württemberg, Germany

 

Workshops, Conferences (Organization)

1999         Conference “Challenges to Traditional Epistemology”, University of Tübingen

2004         Lecture Series “Die Aktualität Kants”, University Saarbrücken

2006-       Cologne Summer School in Philosophy (annual)

2006    David Chalmers (ANU)
2007    Hilary Kornblith (Amherst, USA)
2008    Ruth Millikan (University of Connecticut, USA)
2009    Alvin Goldman (Rutgers, USA)
2010    Ernest Sosa (Rutgers, USA)
2011    Sanford Goldberg (Northwestern University, USA)
2012    Ralph Wedgwood (USC, USA)
2013    Duncan Pritchard (Edinburgh, UK)
2014    David Enoch (Hebrew University Jerusalem, Israel)
2015    Timothy Williamson (Oxford, UK)
2016    Thomas Kelly (Princeton, USA)
2017    Earl Conee & Richard Feldman (Rochester, USA)
2018    Jennifer Lackey (Northwestern University, USA)
2019    Clayton Littlejohn (King’s College London, UK)

2006         GAP-Workshop “Apriori and Implicit Definitions”, FU Berlin (co-organized with Nicola Kompa & Christian Nimtz)

2007         Conference “First Person Authority: Its Nature, Source, Limits and Use”, Duisburg-Essen (co-organized with Thomas Spitzley & Ralf Stöcker)

2008         Conference “Armchair in Flames? Experimental Philosophy and Its Critics”, University of Cologne

2009         Conference “Apriori and Thought Experiments”, University of Fortaleza, Brazil (co-organized with Joachim Horvath & Konrad Utz)

2010         Workshop “Knowledge and Metaphilosophy” with Timothy Williamson, University of Cologne

2011         Conference “Conceptual Analysis and 2-D Semantics”, University of Cologne (co-organized with Jens Kipper)

2012         Conference “The Roles of Experience in Apriori Knowledge”, University of Cologne (co-organized with Magdalena & Brendan Balcerak-Jackson)

2013         Conference “Saving Safety”, University Bonn (co-organized with Elke Brendel)

2014         Graduate Workshop on Epistemology, University Bonn (co-organized with Elke Brendel)

2015         Colloquium at GAP.9 “Philosophy in the Face of Disagreement”, University of Osnabrück

2016         Cologne-Northwestern Workshop on Disagreement, Northwestern University (co-organized with Sanford Goldberg)

                 Conference “Soziale Erkenntnistheorie”, University of Cologne (co-organized with Elke Brendel)

                 Workshop “Disagreement - Conceptual and Semantic Foundations”, University of Bonn (co-organized with Elke Brendel)

2017         Workshop “The Epistemic Dynamics of Disagreement”, University of Colgne (co-organized with Dominik Balg, Elke Brendel, Jan Constantin, Filippo Ferari)

2018         Conference “Fake Knowledge”, University of Cologne (co-organized with Sven Bernecker & Amy Floweree)

                 GAP.10 “Plurality in Philosophy and Beyond”, University of Cologne (co-organized with Joachim Horvath)

                 Workshop “Disagreement within Philosophy”, University of Bonn (co-organized with Dominik Balg, Elke Brendel, Jan Constantin, Filippo Ferari)

2019-       Conferences on Modern Transcendental Philosophy (annual), IUC Dubrovnik (co-organized with Wolfgang Kuhlmann & Audun Öftsi)

2020    Conference “Cross-Linguistic Disagreement”, Kanazawa, Japan (co-organized with Masa Mizumoto & Janardon Ganeri)

 

 

Publications

Books

[B5]         2018 Die Philosophischen Wahrheitstheorien [Philosophical Truth Theories], Reclam, 1. und 2. Auflage 2018.

[B4]         2017 Analytische Einführung in die Erkenntnistheorie [Analytic Introduction to Epistemology], DeGruyter: Berlin/New York, 2. Auflage.

[B3]         2008 Analytische Einführung in die Erkenntnistheorie [Analytic Introduction to Epistemology], De Gruyter: Berlin / New York.

[B2]         2003 Der Wahrheit auf der Spur. Ein Plädoyer für den erkenntnistheoretischen
Externalismus [Tracking the Truth: A Defense of Epistemic Externalism], mentis: Paderborn.

[B1]         1994 Analytische Transzendentalphilosophie [Analytic Transcendental Philosophy]. Eine Kritik, Schöningh: Paderborn.

 

Editions

[E9]         2020 Co-Editor (with Sven Bernecker & Amy Floweree), The Epistemology of Fake News, Oxford University Press.

[E8]         2019 Co-Editor (with Joachim Horvath), Keynote Lectures of GAP.10. Special Issue of Erkenntnis.

[E7]         2016 Co-Editor (with Achim Stephan): Welche und wie viele Flüchtlinge sollen wir aufnehmen?, Reclam.

[E6]         2014 Co-Editor (with Jens Kipper & Joachim Horvath), Die experimentelle Philosophie in der Diskussion, Frankfurt/Main: suhrkamp.

[E5]         2010 Co-Editor (with Joachim Horvath) of two special issues of Philosophical
Psychology
 on Experimental Philosophy 23 (3/4).

                 Reprinted as book: Experimental Philosophy and its Critics, Routledge 2012.

[E4]         2009 Co-Editor (with Ralf Stöcker & Thomas Spitzley) of „First Person Authority“, Sonderband der Zeitschrift Erkenntnis (71).

[E3]         2005 Co-Editor of Anatomie der Subjektivität, Suhrkamp: Frankfurt am Main.

[E2]         2001 Editor of Erkenntnistheorie. Positionen zwischen Tradition und
Gegenwart
, mentis: Paderborn (2. Auflage, Paderborn 2003).

[E1]         1996 Co-Editor (with Karsten Stüber) of Philosophie der Skepsis, Schöningh: Paderborn.

 

Editor of Book Series

[BS1]       2020 - #philosophieorientiert with Metzler (this book series publishes clearly positioned introductions to philosophical topics that are highly relevant to the broader public; 4 titles/year)

 

Articles and Invited Contributions (Papers in Peer Review Journals are indicated by ‘*’)

[A53]       2020 “Conceptual Construction in Epistemology”, in: Masaharu Mizumoto, Steven Stich e.a., Ethno-Epistemology, Routledge (under review).

[A52*]     2020 “Epistemic Authority: The Challenge From Outrageous Expert Judgments”, forthcoming in: Episteme.

[A51*]     2019 “How to Respond Rationally to Peer Disagreement: The Preemption View”, forthcoming in: Philosophical Issues 19 (DOI: 10.1111/phis.12144)

[A50*]     2019 “Why Disagreement-Based Skepticism Cannot Escape the Challenge of Self-Defeat”, forthcoming in: Episteme (DOI: 10.1017/epi.2019.14).

[A49*]     2019 & Sven Bernecker: “Knowledge From Forgetting”, in: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98: 525-540.

[A48*]     2018 & Jan Constantin: “Epistemic Authority: Preemption Through Source Sensitive Defeat”, in: Synthese (DOI: 10.1007/s11229-018-01923-x).

[A47*]     2018 „Egoismus, Altruismus und die Furcht vor dem eigenen Tod. Ein Beitrag zur Analytischen Existenzphilosophie“, in: Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 72 (4):465-491.

[A46*]     2018 “Saving Safety From Counterexamples”, in: Synthese (DOI: 10.1007/s11229-018-1677-z).

[A45]       2018 “Progress and Historical Reflection in Philosophy”, in: Philosophy and the Historical Perspective, ed. by Marcel van Ackeren, Proceedings of the British Academy (OUP): 51-68. 

[A44]       2017 "Platonism and the A Priori in Thought Experiments", in:
The Routledge Companion of Thought Experiments, ed. by James Robert Brown, Yiftach Fehige und Michael T. Stuart.

[A43]       2016 "New Lessons from Old Demons: The Case for Reliabilism". In:
Putnam and the Brain-in-a-Vat: Classical Arguments Reconsidered, ed. by Sanford Goldberg, Cambridge University Press. 

[A42*]     2015 "How Reliabilism saves the A Priori/A Posteriori Distinction", in: Synthese 192:2747–2768.

[A41]       2015 "Das Problem stabiler Dissense in der Erkenntnistheorie", in: Epistemology Futures, ed. by Dirk Koppelberg & Stefan Tolksdorf, mentis.

[A40]       2014 & Christoph Beierle, Gabriele Kern-Isberner & Niki Pfeifer: "Wissen", in: Handbuch Kognitionswissenschaft, ed. by Achim Stephan & Sven Walter.

[A39]       2014 "Internalismus und Externalismus der Rechtfertigung", in: Grundkurs
Erkenntnistheorie, ed. by Oliver Scholz & Nikola Kompa, mentis.

[A38*]     2014 & Joachim Horvath: "Erratum to: Thought Experiments and the Problem of Deviant Realizations", in: Philosophical Studies 170: 535-536. 

[A37*]     2014 & Joachim Horvath: "Thought Experiments and the Problem of Deviant Realizations", in: Philosophical Studies 170: 525-533.

[A36]       2013 "Doubts about Philosophy? The Alleged Challenge from Disagreement", in: Knowledge, Virtue, and Action: Puting Epistemic Virtues to Work, ed. by Tim Henning & David Schweikard, New York: Routledge: 72-98. 

[A35*]     2010 “Some Hope for Intuitions. A Reply to Weinberg”, in: Philosophical Psychology23: 481-509.

[A34]       2010 “Defeasibility Theories”, in: Routledge Companion to Epistemology, ed. by
Sven Bernecker / Duncan Pritchard, Routledge.

[A33]       2009 „Ist Wissen erkenntnistheoretisch fundamental? Eine Kritik an Williamson“, in: Gerhard Schönrich (ed.), Wissen und Werte, mentis: 45-69. 

[A32]       2009 “Die Wahrnehmung kausaler Prozesse”. In: Richard Schantz (ed.),
Die Philosophie der Wahrnehmung, in: Philosophical Analysis, ontos: 211-228. 

[A31*]     2009 „Reliabilism and the Problem of Defeaters“, in: Grazer Philosophische Studien79: 65-76. 

[A30*]     2009 „Introspective Self-Knowledge and Reasoning. An Externist Guide“, in: Erkenntnis 71: 89-105.

[A29*]     2007 „The nature of rational intuitions and a fresh look at the explanationist objection“, in: Grazer Philosophische Studien 74: 69-87. 

                 Reprinted in: C. Beyer/A. Burri (Hg.), Philosophical Knowledge:
Its Possibility and Scope, Amsterdam.

[A28]       2006 „Transzendentalphilosophie ohne Idealismus?“. In: Metaphysik als
Wissenschaft, ed. by Dirk Fonfara, Freiburg/München: 190-210. 

[A27]       2006 „Die Grenzen des Verstehens“. In: Tradition und Traditionsbruch zwischen
Skepsis und Dogmatik, ed. by Claudia Bickmann e.a., Amsterdam/New York: 59-72.

[A26]       2005 „Warum ich weiß, dass ich kein Zombie bin“. In: Den eigenen Geist kennen, ed. by Albert Newen/ Gottfried Vosgerau, Paderborn: 135-149. 

[A25]       2005 „Descartes’ Cogito-Argument. Versuch einer sinnkritischen Rekonstruktion“, in: Anatomie der Subjektivität, ed. by von T. Grundmann, Frankfurt am Main: 255-
276. 

[A24]       2004 „Widerspricht der erkenntnistheoretische Externalismus unseren Intuitionen?“. In: Knowledge and Belief. Proceedings of the 26th International Wittgenstein Symposium, ed. by W. Löffler / P. Weingartner, Wien.

[A23]       2004 „Counterexamples to Epistemic Externalism revisited“. In: The Externalist
Challenge, ed. by Richard Schantz, Berlin / New York.

[A22*]     2004 „Inferential Contextualism, Epistemological Realism and Scepticism. A Reply to Michael Williams“. In: Erkenntnis 61: 345-352.

[A21*]     2003 „Die Grenzen des erkenntnistheoretischen Kontextualismus“. In: Deutsche
Zeitschrift für Philosophie 
51.

[A20]       2003 „Perceptual Representations as Basic Reasons“. In: Perception and Reality. From Descartes to the Present, ed. by Ralph Schumacher, Paderborn: 286-303.

[A19]       2003 „Was ist eigentlich ein transzendentales Argument?“. In: Warum Kant heute?
Bedeutung und Relevanz seiner Philosophie in der Gegenwart, ed. by Dietmar
Heidemann und Kristina Engelhard, Berlin / New York: 44-75.

[A18]       2003 „Wenn der Determinismus wahr wäre. Über die Möglichkeit von Willensfreiheit in der natürlichen Welt“. In: Monismus. Festschrift für Andreas Graeser , ed. by Andreas Baechli / Klaus Petrus, Frankfurt /London: 293-313.

[A17]       2003 & Catrin Misselhorn: „Transcendental Arguments and Realism“. In: Kant and
Strawson, ed. by H. J. Glock, Oxford University Press: 205-218.

[A16*]     2002 „Die Struktur des skeptischen Traumarguments“. In: Grazer Philosophische
Studien 
64: 57-81.

[A15*]     2002 „Warum wir Wissen als einen wichtigen Begriff der Erkenntnistheorie betrachten sollten – Eine Antwort auf Ansgar Beckermann“. In: Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 56: 118-124. 

[A14*]     2001/2 „Was der erkenntnistheoretische Internalist vergißt“. In: Logos N.F. 7: 361-385.

[A13*]     2001 „Das erkenntnistheoretische Regreßargument“. In: Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 55: 221-245.

[A12*]     2001 „Eine psychologische Verteidigung des erkenntnistheoretischen Realismus“. In: Erkenntnistheorie, ed. by T. Grundmann, Mentis: Paderborn: 188-209.

[A11*]     2001 „Die traditionelle Erkenntnistheorie und ihre Herausforderer“. In:
Erkenntnistheorie, ed. by T. Grundmann, Mentis: Paderborn: 9-29.

[A10*]     1999 „BonJour's Self-Defeating Argument for Coherentism“. In: Erkenntnis 50: 463-479.

[A9*]       1997 „Tendenzen der gegenwärtigen analytischen Erkenntnistheorie“. In: Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 51: 627-648.

[A8]         1999 & Frank Hofmann: „Ist der radikale Empirismus epistemisch
selbstwidersprüchlich?“. In: Die Zukunft des Wissens, ed. by Jürgen
Mittelstraß, Universitätsverlag Konstanz: 684-691.

[A7]         1999 „Burge's antirealistic argument against epiphenomenalism“. In: Analyomen 3, ed. by J. Nida-Rümelin, Berlin / New York: 521-528.

[A6]         „The Two Faces of Skepticism in Aenesidemus-Schulze“. In: The Skeptica l
Tradition around 1800 , ed. by R. Popkin / J. v. d. Zande, Kluwer: Dordrecht:
133-141.

[A5]         „Bedingungen des Verstehens als Bedingungen der Gegenstände des
Verstehens“. In: Analyomen 2 , ed. by G. Meggle / P. Steinacker, Berlin / New
York, Vol..1: 232-245.

[A4*]       „Gibt es ein subjektives Fundament unseres Wissens?“ In: Zeitschrift für
philosophische Forschung
: 458-472.

[A3]         1996 „Can Science be alikened to a well-written fairy-tale? A contemporary reply to Schlick's objections to Neurath's coherence theory“. In: Vienna Circle Institute
Yearbook 4: 127-133.

[A2]         1994 „Attribution oder Proposition? H.-N. Castanedas Kritik an Chisholms und Lewis' Selbstbewußtseinstheorien“. In: Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewußtseins , ed. by M. Frank, Suhrkamp: Frankfurt/M.

[A1]         1990 „Filosofia trascendentale analitica versus filosofia trascendentale conscienzia“. In: Euntes Docete 44.

 

Reviews and Entries

[R8]         2016 Lexikonartikel zu „Apriori“ und „Notwendigkeit“. In: Lexikon der Erkenntnistheorie, hrsg. von Thomas Bonk, WBG.

[R7]         2002 Rezension zu „Robert Stern (Hrsg.): Transcendental Arguments. Problems and Prospects, Oxford: Clarendon 1999“ und „Robert Stern: Transcendental
Arguments and Scepticism. Answering the Question of Justification, Oxford:
Clarendon 2000“. In: Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 56: 155-164.

[R6]         1998 Rezension zu "Thomas Bartelborth: Begründungsstrategien, Akademie Verlag: Berlin 1996". In: Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung.

[R5]         1995 Lexikonartikel zu "Ding an sich", "Gehirn im Tank" und "Reliabilität". In: Metzler Philosophie Lexikon, ed. by P. Prechtl / F. P. Burkard, Metzler: Stuttgart.

[R4]         1996 Rezension zu "Hilary Putnam: Renewing Philosophy, HUP: Cambridge / MA
1992; Words and Life, HUP: Cambridge 1994". In: Philosophische Rundschau 43: 64-70.

[R3]         1995 Rezension von "Alex Buri: Hilary Putnam, Frankfurt/M. 1994". In:Philosophische Rundschau.

[R2]         1994 Bericht vom XVI. Deutschen Kongreß für Philosophie. In: Zeitschrift für
philosophische Forschung 
48: 292-299.

[R1]         1993 Rezension von "Geert Lueke-Lueken: Inkommensurabilität als Problem rationaler Argumentation". In: Philosophische Rundschau 40: 325-329.

 

Other Publications

  • Rede auf dem March for Science Rheinland, Köln 14.04.2018.
  • Wie gute Philosophie wirklich tickt, in: Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger 17.03.2018.  
  • Quicklebendige Philosophie, in: Tagesspiegel 2. März 2018.
  • Der Weg der Wahrheitsfindung, DUZ 01/2018
  • Die Wahrheit über Fake News, FAZ 21.06.2017
  • Akademische Philosophie und Öffentlichkeit, Information Philosophie 2017.  
  • Flüchtlingsdebatte - Sloterdijks intellektuelle Selbstdemontage, Frankfurter Rundschau 15.3.2016
  • Stellungnahmen zu „Das Ende des ‚linguistic turn‘?“, Information Philosophie (4) 2016: 28-38. 
  • & Thomas Nisters e.a.: Vorschläge zur Verbesserung des Philosophieunterrichts, Information Philosophie (4) 2014, 42-54.